Israel’s Future In The Balance: What Will Change If Netanyahu Loses?
(ANALYSIS) Israel’s election on Tuesday could mark a dramatic turning point for a country battered by war, political turmoil and growing international isolation. If the opposition manages to replace Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the consequences could extend far beyond a change of leadership.
A new government could reverse the assault on democratic institutions, investigate the catastrophic failures of Oct. 7, end the extraordinary military exemptions enjoyed by the ultra-Orthodox, curb Jewish extremism in the West Bank and begin repairing Israel’s shattered relations with much of the world. For many Israelis, the stakes are nothing less than the country’s long-term survival.
The polls suggest that Netanyahu’s coalition will lose its parliamentary majority, but that may be the easy part. The opposition, led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot, faces a potentially crippling contradiction: It seems like that it will be capable of commanding a majority in the 120-member Knesset only with the support of Arab parties, yet several of its leaders have promised not to rely on them. Unless they find a way around that commitment, Israel could emerge from the election with a clear majority opposed to Netanyahu but no alternative government capable of taking power.
For much of Israel’s secular, educated and economically productive population, the desperation to remove Netanyahu is palpable. Tens of thousands living abroad have been streaming home to vote, amid estimates that more than a quarter-million Israelis left during his current term.
After Oct. 7, years of warfare, immense loss of life, democratic erosion and international isolation, another Netanyahu victory would convince many that Israel has crossed a point of no return. The spectacle of far-right figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich representing the country has compounded their humiliation.
The fear is of a monumental brain drain, the damage could be irreversible.
Talk of Israel’s survival is therefore not necessarily hysterical. A country weakened by emigration, threatened with European sanctions and declining American support could lose the technological and military superiority on which its security depends, inviting aggression. An Israel increasingly dominated by ultra-Orthodox communities that largely reject military service and modern secular education would face further difficulties. It is an astonishing predicament for a technological powerhouse whose GDP per capita exceeds that of France, Britain and Germany.
Netanyahu, meanwhile, has responded to unfavorable polls with apocalyptic warnings. On Sunday, he shared an AI-generated image of a nuclear explosion engulfing Tel Aviv, suggesting his defeat could expose Israel to a second Holocaust at Iran’s hands. Days earlier, he raised the prospect of international banking sanctions and proposed using cryptocurrencies and blockchain technology to circumvent them. The Bank of Israel rejected the idea as unworkable, while economists warned of potentially disastrous consequences.
In another reflection of Netanyahu’s apparent desperation, CNN reported that he tried to persuade President Trump to launch a joint attack on Iran before the election. Netanyahu’s government denies the report. But what is extraordinary is how readily the allegation is believed in Israel. The notion that a prime minister might deliberately trigger a war for political advantage should be staggering – and disqualifying. That so many Israelis consider it plausible speaks volumes about the almost unbearable tension gripping the country ahead of Tuesday’s vote.
What, then, would actually change if the opposition managed to take power and govern?
Democracy: Reversing the march toward autocracy
The central domestic issue is Netanyahu’s attempt to transform Israel from a liberal democracy, in which citizens enjoy guaranteed rights and the government faces institutional checks, into something resembling an elected autocracy. His coalition has pursued an extensive program to weaken the judiciary, undermine independent legal authorities and concentrate power in the government. Supporters describe this as a necessary correction to excessive judicial power; critics see a transparent power grab – and a plot to end Netanyahu’s corruption trials.
Some measures have been enacted, including legislation weakening the attorney general’s position. Others have been blocked by the Supreme Court, notably the attempt to eliminate the judicial doctrine of reasonableness, which allows courts to review certain government decisions. Still others have been delayed or disrupted by the Gaza war.
The broader ambition has included giving politicians decisive control over judicial appointments and enabling the Knesset to override Supreme Court rulings by a simple majority, potentially leaving few meaningful constraints on government power.
An opposition victory would mean dismantling this project. That would not preclude judicial reform: Israel’s notoriously slow courts, lengthy trials and cumbersome judicial appointments require attention. But the distinction would be between improving the judiciary and subordinating it to politicians.
Oct. 7: The investigation that never happened
The Hamas-led invasion on Oct. 7, 2023, was the greatest security catastrophe in Israel’s history. Thousands of attackers breached the Gaza border, massacring some 1,200 people and taking hundreds hostage.
Communities were overrun while the military response was disastrously delayed. Yet Netanyahu’s government has resisted establishing an independent state commission of inquiry into the failures that made the disaster possible. It has even been quietly promoting conspiracy theories that a “leftist” security establishment helped Hamas. And, of course, it has dared to actually run again.
All this has become politically radioactive. Critics accuse Netanyahu of trying to evade responsibility and prolong wars as a distraction, while hoping public anger will eventually dissipate. The issue is not simply accountability but national survival: understanding how the country’s defenses collapsed is essential to preventing another catastrophe.
The opposition is committed to establishing such an inquiry promptly, with a mandate that could implicate military and intelligence leaders as well as the political leadership, including Netanyahu himself.
Netanyahu’s trial: Closing the loophole
Israel’s legal system contains a remarkable anomaly. Politicians facing serious criminal proceedings can be barred from ministerial and certain other public offices, yet an indicted politician can serve as prime minister.
The Supreme Court allowed Netanyahu to form a government while standing trial, subject to conflict-of-interest restrictions – which he agreed to in an affidavit – to prevent his legal predicament from influencing his exercise of power.
His subsequent campaign to reshape the judiciary has made a mockery of that commitment. Opposition politicians intend to close the loophole through legislation restricting the ability of politicians under criminal indictment to serve as prime minister, preventing another situation in which a leader facing prosecution exercises authority over the institutions administering justice.
The ultra-Orthodox: Ending a system of exemptions
Perhaps the most consequential long-term domestic challenge involves Israel’s rapidly growing ultra-Orthodox, or Haredi, population. The Haredim constitute roughly one-sixth of Israel’s population, with families averaging more than six children. Many boys receive little or no secular education in mathematics, English or science. Male workforce participation is relatively low, and many families depend heavily on public assistance. Given the community’s rapid demographic growth, the implications for Israel’s economy and society are enormous.
But the most politically explosive issue is military service. For decades, ultra-Orthodox men studying in religious seminaries have enjoyed sweeping draft exemptions or deferments, even as other Jewish Israelis face compulsory military service.
The arrangement creates a perverse incentive: remaining in religious study is the path to avoid conscription, while leaving the seminary — and entering the labor market — exposes a young man to the draft. The result is a system that discourages employment and places an increasingly unequal military burden on the rest of society. Adding insult to injury, the Israeli taxpayer is forced to pay subsidies to the yeshiva students – rather than the students paying tuition as those in university do.
After Oct. 7 and the prolonged wars that followed, public tolerance for this arrangement has diminished sharply. Polls have repeatedly shown overwhelming support for ending the exemptions. Netanyahu seeks to formalize the arrangement for his Haredi coalition partners, while the principal opposition parties are committed to ending it. Broader changes to education, employment incentives and public subsidies are also needed, but ending the draft exemption system would be the immediate test.
The Palestinians: A change in methods
Historically, Israel’s center-left has been more receptive to partitioning the land and establishing a demilitarized Palestinian state in much of the West Bank and Gaza than the right. Israeli governments made far-reaching proposals in 2000-2001 and again in 2008, without achieving a final agreement.
Oct. 7, however, has profoundly changed the political atmosphere. Even many Israelis who once supported territorial compromise are unwilling to contemplate further withdrawals while Hamas remains an armed force capable of threatening Israel.
An opposition government would therefore be unlikely to launch an ambitious peace initiative in the near term. But significant changes could still follow.
An alternative government could be expected to crack down on violent Jewish extremists in the West Bank, curb the settlement expansion encouraged by Netanyahu’s far-right partners, and restore some credibility to the prospect of an eventual political settlement. It would also continue efforts to prevent Hamas from reconstituting itself as an armed force in Gaza or the West Bank.
The difference would be less about immediate territorial concessions than about abandoning the ideological extremism and permissiveness toward settler violence that have characterized the present government.
Iran and Hezbollah: Tough security policies
A change of government would not necessarily mean a softer Israeli approach to Iran or Hezbollah. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons commands broad support across Israel’s political spectrum, as does the determination to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its military threat along Israel’s northern border.
Netanyahu’s military campaign against Hezbollah enjoyed substantial domestic support, including among his opponents (and, in fact, is aligned with the ultimate goals of the government of Lebanon). An opposition government would be expected to maintain pressure on the organization and insist on effective security arrangements in Lebanon.
The change would be in diplomatic style and strategic coordination. Rather than treating international criticism as a badge of honor, an opposition government would be more inclined to coordinate with partners, combining military resolve with greater diplomatic engagement.
Repairing Israel’s shattered relationships
Netanyahu’s government has left Israel increasingly isolated internationally, particularly because of the Gaza war, settlement policies and the conduct of its far-right ministers. Relations with European governments have deteriorated amid growing pressure for sanctions.
Netanyahu’s close identification with the American Republican right has damaged Israel’s traditional bipartisan standing in Washington. Many liberal American Jews have become deeply alienated by the government’s religious nationalism and the rhetoric of ministers such as Smotrich and Ben-Gvir.
An opposition government would attempt a major diplomatic reset. That would not eliminate disagreements over the Palestinians or Israel’s military operations, but it would offer a government more interested in rebuilding alliances than antagonizing its critics, and more capable of making Israel’s case to democratic partners whose support remains strategically indispensable.
For Israel’s business and technology sectors, whose prosperity depends on access to international markets, investment and financial institutions, the restoration of normal relations with the world is an absolute economic necessity.
Coalition negotiations: Winning may be the easy part
None of these changes is guaranteed, even if Netanyahu loses his parliamentary majority. An Oct. 23 Maariv poll projected 48 seats for Netanyahu’s coalition, 58 for non-Arab parties outside it, and 14 for the Arab parties – and most other credible polls painted a similar picture. That would give Netanyahu’s opponents a commanding 72-seat majority in the 120-member Knesset, where a majority of 61 is needed to confirm a government — but only if the Arab parties are counted.
If the polls are right – and historically this has roughly been the case – the simplest route to an alternative government would be a coalition of Jewish opposition parties governing with outside parliamentary support from Arab parties.
Such an arrangement would not necessarily require Arab parties to hold ministries or participate in national security decisions. But Naftali Bennett and Avigdor Liberman have rejected dependence on Arab parties, while other opposition figures have shown greater flexibility.
Other scenarios include persuading ultra-Orthodox parties to abandon Netanyahu, attracting defectors from Likud, or constructing a broader coalition of right-wing and centrist parties. Liberman and other leaders could use the uncertainty to demand powerful ministries, major policy concessions or even a rotation agreement for the premiership.
Because an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement is unlikely to be on the immediate agenda, cooperation between the center and parts of the nationalist right may prove easier than in previous eras. But judicial reform, the Haredi draft and Netanyahu’s legal future could become major stumbling blocks.
There is, though, a precedent. In 1992, Yitzhak Rabin’s Labor-Meretz bloc won only 56 seats, but the support of five Arab legislators gave the anti-Likud camp a majority. Rabin ultimately formed a coalition with the ultra-Orthodox Shas party rather than bringing Arab parties into government. Something similar could happen again. Alternatively, coalition deadlock could lead to another election — or leave Netanyahu in charge of a temporary “caretaker government” despite an electoral majority opposed to him.
That is the drama facing Israel. For millions of Israelis who believe their country’s future is at stake, there might be an extraordinary possibility of national recovery after years of trauma and division. But to accomplish any of it, the opposition’s leaders may first have to abandon their refusal to rely on the votes of Israel’s Arab citizens — roughly one-fifth of the population.
The promise was understandable. The opposition needs to attract former Netanyahu voters; they overwhelmingly do not trust the Arabs, and some are simply racists. But rarely have democratic politics produced a promise that more clearly needs to be broken.
This story was originally published in the Forward. Click here to get the Forward’s free email newsletters delivered to your inbox.
Dan Perry is the former chief editor of The Associated Press in Europe, Africa and the Middle East, the former chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem, and the author of two books about Israel.